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A R T I C L E
Taking Public Access to the 
Law Seriously: The Problem 
of Private Control Over the 
Availability of Federal Standards
by Nina A . Mendelson
Nina A . Mendelson is the Joseph L . Sax Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School .
In the 1930s, Harvard professor Erwin Griswold famously complained about the enormous num-bers of New Deal regulations that were obscurely 
published on individual sheets or in “separate paper 
pamphlets .”1 Finding these binding federal rules was dif-
ficult, leading to “chaos” and an “intolerable” situation .2 
Congress responded, requiring that agencies publish all 
rules in the Federal Register and in the Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) .3 Currently, recent federal public laws, 
the entire U.S. Code, the Federal Register, and the CFR 
are all freely available online as well as in governmental 
depository libraries .4
But with respect to thousands of federal regulations, the 
clock has been turned back—and worse . To save resources 
and build on private expertise, federal agencies have incor-
porated privately drafted standards into numerous fed-
eral regulations, but only by “reference .” These standards 
range widely . The CFR presently contains nearly 9,500 
“incorporations by reference” of standards, often referred 
to as “IBR” rules . Many IBR rules incorporate privately 
1 . Erwin Griswold, Government in Ignorance of the Law—A Plea for Better Pub-
lication of Executive Legislation, 48 Harv . L . Rev . 198, 199, 294 (1934) . 
Griswold notes that the thousands of pages of “law” issued in one year were 
“scattered among 5,991 press releases during this period .” Id. at 199 . These 
laws included hundreds of “industry” codes drafted under the auspices of 
the National Industrial Recovery Act . See Mila Sohoni, Notice and the New 
Deal, 62 Duke L .J . 1169, 1179 (2013) .
2 . Griswold, supra note 1, at 204, 205 .
3 . Note, The Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations—A Reapprais-
al, 80 Harv . L . Rev . 439, 440-41 (1966) .
4 . E.g., Thomas, Library of Cong ., http://thomas .loc .gov (last visited Sept . 
29, 2013) (access to legislative materials); Federal Digital System, U .S . Gov’t 
Printing Office, http://www .gpo .gov/fdsys (last visited Sept . 29, 2013) 
(providing decades of access to the CFR, Federal Register, and all statutes) .
drafted standards from so-called “standards development 
organizations” or “SDOs,” organizations ranging from 
the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) 
to the American Petroleum Institute (API) .5 Recent IBR 
rules cover food additives, pipeline operation, and infant 
product safety .6 Agency use of IBR rules is likely to grow . 
Since the 1990s, both executive branch and congressional 
policies have officially encouraged agency use of privately 
drafted standards .
An individual who seeks access to this binding law gen-
erally cannot freely read it online or in a governmental 
depository library as she can the U.S. Code or the rest of 
the CFR . The SDOs generally claim copyright and reserve 
the right to earn revenue by selling standards . Accordingly, 
an individual typically must first locate the standard, either 
on the SDO’s website or by contacting the SDO, and then 
pay a significant SDO-set access fee . Otherwise she must 
travel to Washington, D .C ., to the Office of the Federal 
Register’s (OFR) reading room .7
This law, under largely private control, is not formally 
“secret,” but it is difficult to find and expensive . The incor-
porated standard for infant sling carriers is currently 
priced at $51 .608; incorporated pipeline safety standards 
are roughly $150 per standard9; others can be far more 
5 . Emily S . Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in an Open-Government Age, 36 
Harv . J .L . & Pub . Pol’y 131, 150 (2013) .
6 . E.g. Pipeline Safety: Periodic Updates of Regulatory References to Tech-
nical Standards and Miscellaneous Amendments, 78 Fed . Reg . 49996-99 
(Aug . 16, 2013) (noting 64 incorporated-by-reference standards, includ-
ing safety, transport, and public notification); Food Additive Regulations: 
Incorporation by Reference of the Food Chemicals Codex, 7th ed ., 78 Fed . 
Reg . 71457 (Nov . 29, 2013); Safety Standards for Infant Walkers and Infant 
Swings, 78 Fed . Reg . 37706 (June 24, 2013) .
7 . Agencies also sometimes provide access in their reading rooms, typically in 
Washington, D .C .
8 . Standard Consumer Safety Specification for Sling Carriers, ASTM Int’l, 
http://www .astm .org/DATABASE .CART/HISTORICAL/F2907-14A .
htm (last visited Mar . 27, 2015) . Although ASTM maintains a “reading 
room,” as of March 2015, the standard was inexplicably unavailable .
9 . Emily Bremer, On the Cost of Private Standards in Public Law, 63 U . Kan . 
L . Rev . 279, 315 (2015) .
This Article was adapted from Nina A . Mendelson, Private Control 
Over Access to the Law: The Perplexing Federal Regulatory Use of 
Private Standards, 112 Mich . L . Rev . 737 (2014). It has been 
excerpted and updated with permission of Michigan Law Review 
and Nina A. Mendelson. Please see the full article for footnotes and 
sources.
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expensive . Others have discussed the difficult question 
whether SDOs still possess a valid copyright in standards 
that an agency incorporates by reference . More generally, 
the IBR rule problem raises the question of what underlies 
the intuition that law, in a democracy, needs to be readily, 
publicly available .
Ready public access to the law is critical to provide notice 
of obligations not only to regulated entities, but also to 
consumers, neighbors, and other regulatory beneficiaries . 
This concern has been incorporated into constitutional due 
process doctrine .10 Access is also vital to ensure that fed-
eral agencies are meaningfully accountable to the public 
for their decisions .11 Finally, expressive harm—a message 
inconsistent with core democratic values—is likely to flow 
from governmental adoption of regulatory law that is, in 
contrast to American law in general, harder to find and 
costly to access .
Fully considering why law needs to be public and how 
public it needs to be strengthens the case for IBR reform, 
whether administrative or legislative . It also limits the 
range of acceptable reform measures . The Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) permits incorporations by refer-
ence into the Federal Register only when the incorporated 
text is “reasonably available to the class of persons affected 
thereby .”12 A clearer understanding of why law needs to 
be readily, publicly available could inform judicial inter-
pretations both of FOIA and of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act’s (APA’s) public participation requirements .13 
In 2013, the OFR, which FOIA tasks with approving 
agency incorporations by reference, agreed to revise its 
rule . In November 2014, the OFR issued a final rule14 
that, unfortunately, missed an opportunity to signifi-
cantly expand the public availability of the thousands of 
IBR rules . But even if the OFR does not take on broader 
reform, individual agencies also could change their incor-
poration practices .
Finally, assessing public access needs in the setting of 
agency use of privately drafted IBR rules also sheds some 
light on how we should think about the value of governmen-
tal transparency . The law must be sufficiently public, with 
a meaningful level of free availability, to provide notice, 
ensure that government is accountable for its decisions, and 
to express a commitment to core democratic values .
10 . See, e.g., Nina A . Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency 
Policymaking, 92 Cornell L . Rev . 397, 414 (2007) .
11 . E.g., Kathleen Clark, The Architecture of Accountability: A Case Study of the 
Warrantless Surveillance Program, 2010 BYU L . Rev . 357, 389-404 .
12 . 5 U .S .C . §552(a)(1) (2012) .
13 . See 5 U .S .C . §552(a) (2012) (Freedom of Information Act); 5 U .S .C . §553 
(2012) (Administrative Procedure Act rulemaking requirements) .
14 . Incorporation by Reference, 79 Fed . Reg . 66267 (Nov . 7, 2014) .
I. Incorporation by Reference of Private 
Standards
A. The Use and Costs of Privately Developed 
Standards
In 1966, Congress included a provision in FOIA permitting 
the director of the Federal Register to approve an agency’s 
“incorporation by reference” of material published else-
where into regulatory text without reprinting it in the Fed-
eral Register .15 The material must, however, be “reasonably 
available to the class of persons affected thereby .”16 Beyond 
this requirement, OFR regulations permit incorporation 
by reference of a publication only if it “substantially reduces 
the volume of material published in the Federal Register .”17 
The publication must also consist of “published data, cri-
teria, standards, specifications, techniques, illustrations, or 
similar material .”18 Congress expected this material at least 
to be available in libraries .19
In the mid-1990s, both Congress and the White House 
directed agencies, where practicable, to utilize privately 
developed standards rather than writing new “govern-
ment-unique” standards . The Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) issued Circular No . A-119 in 1982, 
most recently revising it in 1998, directing agencies to 
rely on voluntary standards, including industry standards 
or consensus codes, rather than “government-unique 
standards .”20 After the publication of the original ver-
sion of this article, OMB announced proposed revisions 
to Circular A-119, but the proposed revisions continue to 
emphasize use of such standards .21
Some such standards have been drafted without antici-
pating agency incorporation .22 Others undoubtedly have 
been written with the hope—or the plan—of incorpora-
tion into federal regulatory law .23 Circular No . A-119 con-
templates that agencies may provide financial support to an 
SDO to complete a standard .24 Agency officials may also 
participate in SDO deliberations .25
15 . 5 U .S .C . §552(a)(1) (2012) .
16 . Id.
17 . 1 C .F .R . §51 .7(a)(3) (2013) .
18 . Id.
19 . See Peter L . Strauss, Private Standards Organizations and Public Law, 22 
Wm . & Mary Bill Rts . J . 497, 519 (2013) .
20 . Office of Mgmt . & Budget, Circular No . A-119 Revised: Federal 
Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus 
Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities para . 1 (1998) 
[hereinafter Circular No . A-119], available at http://www .whitehouse .
gov/omb/circulars_a119 .
21 . Request for Comments on a Proposed Revision of OMB Circular No . 
A-119, 79 Fed . Reg . 8207 (Feb . 11, 2014) . Proposed revisions are available 
at WhiteHouse .gov, Information Policy, http://www .whitehouse .gov/
omb/inforeg_infopoltech (last visited Feb . 18, 2015) .
22 . E.g., Strauss, supra note 19, at 546 .
23 . Id. at 513 .
24 . Circular No . A-119, supra note 20, para . 7(b) .
25 . See Strauss, supra note 19, at 506 .
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In developing policy favoring the use of private volun-
tary standards, neither Congress nor the original drafters 
of OMB Circular No . A-119 appeared to anticipate that 
SDOs would both claim copyrights in their incorporated 
standards and charge access fees . In any event, current 
agency practice is to incorporate standards even if SDOs 
charge a significant price for access,26 and OFR’s rule 
requires only that agencies “discuss” what was done to 
provide public access to an incorporated rule . Meanwhile, 
the amounts charged far exceed the “direct costs of search, 
duplication, or review” that federal agencies may charge for 
FOIA requests for internal agency documents .27 As numer-
ous groups and citizens have recently written, the fees that 
SDOs charge can be prohibitive, particularly for ordinary 
citizens and small businesses subject to the standards .
 In a positive development, some SDOs have begun to 
create online reading rooms in which some IBR rules can 
be freely viewed . But readers must waive rights or even 
agree to indemnification and forum selection clauses to 
view the rules . Meanwhile, access is erratic, and SDOs uni-
formly reserve the right to revoke that access at will . For 
most citizens, travel to a Washington, D .C ., reading room 
is not a viable alternative .
B. SDO Procedures
Private organizations that issue standards have widely vari-
able processes, and federal law requires no particular proce-
dures for the development of outside material that an agency 
incorporates by reference .28 Circular No . A-119 does pro-
vide general criteria for the voluntary consensus standard 
that it encourages agencies to adopt . A voluntary consensus 
standard is one that comes from a “voluntary consensus 
standards bod[y],” which generally has the attributes of 
“[o]penness,” “[b]alance of interest,” “[d]ue process,” and 
an “appeals process,” together with the goal of “[c]onsen-
sus,” which means that the procedure must be designed to 
yield “general agreement, but not necessarily unanimity,” 
including a “process for attempting to resolve objections by 
interested parties .”29 But these “voluntary consensus stan-
dards body” attributes are not actually required . Neither 
statute nor OMB policy appears to constrain an agency 
from incorporating a “nonconsensus standard”30 or even 
includes a preference for a consensus standard .
As a practical matter, and notwithstanding Circular No . 
A-119’s criteria, SDO processes vary widely . For example, 
at the API, whose standards are incorporated close to 280 
times in the CFR,31 standards development is undertaken 
primarily by committee . While outsiders apparently may 
26 . Draft Circular A-119 devotes only a single cursory paragraph to public access 
issues . See Office of Mgmt . and Budget, Proposed Revisions to the 
Circular, 10 (Feb . 10, 2014), available at https://www .whitehouse .gov/
sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/revisions-to-a-119-for-public-comments . 
pdf .
27 . 5 U .S .C . §552(a)(4)(A)(iv) (2012) .
28 . 5 U .S .C . §552(a) (2012) .
29 . Circular No . A-119, supra note 20, para . 4 .
30 . Id . at para . 6(g) .
31 . See Bremer, supra note 5, at 150 .
participate, the organization requires a company name for 
application to participate, warns that travel is required, 
and states that it is advisable to have “your management’s 
support in order to facilitate effective participation .”32 At 
ASTM International, the SDO that has supplied the most 
incorporated standards to the federal government (close 
to 900 standards, incorporated over 2,000 times in the 
CFR33), only members may participate in standards devel-
opment; the lowest level of membership costs $75 per year .34 
Further, although SDOs may strive to implement detailed 
internal processes for standards development and drafting, 
SDOs are not subject to the transparency requirements of 
the APA or FOIA’s hearing or public comment require-
ments, because those statutes apply only to “agencies .”35
At best, then, full public access to SDO decisionmak-
ing is limited, and even when such an organization’s pro-
cess is formally open to participation, it is often difficult to 
tell who participates in decisions . At worst, groups may be 
unrepresentative and decisionmaking closed . SDOs have 
been criticized as being dominated by regulated entities 
and, in particular, by the largest of those entities .36 Fur-
ther, perhaps obviously, SDOs are not bound by agency 
authorizing statutes; thus, they are under no obligation to 
prepare standards that meet statutory criteria .
Although federal agencies generally conduct notice-
and-comment proceedings when incorporating a private 
standard, and this federal rulemaking process is open to 
the public at http://www .regulations .gov, this process is 
unlikely to fill potential gaps in SDO processes . APA rule-
making requirements call for an agency to publish a pro-
posed rule and provide an opportunity for public comment 
before finalizing the rule .37 An agency will typically state in 
a proposed rule that it plans to incorporate private material 
by reference, and the revised OFR rule requires the agency 
to summarize the material to be incorporated . Unfortu-
nately, contrary to the practice with agency-drafted rules, 
the text the agency plans to incorporate is generally not 
included in the Federal Register . Instead, a putative public 
commenter is generally referred to the SDO for the text of 
the rule, subject to whatever restrictions the SDO imposes, 
including an access fee . Further, unlike federal agencies, 
private SDOs appear to be under no particular or consis-
tent obligation to disclose the data underlying their stan-
dards to the public, undermining any meaningful public 
right to comment .38
32 . See Standards Committee Application, Am . Petroleum Inst ., http://www .
api .org/publications-standards-and-statistics/standards-committee-applica-
tion .aspx (last visited Sept . 29, 2013) .
33 . See Bremer, supra note 5, at 150 .
34 . See Technical Committees, ASTM Int’l, http://www .astm .org/COMMIT/
newcommit .html (last visited Sept . 29, 2013) .
35 . See 5 U .S .C . §551(a) (2012) (defining “agency”); id. §552 (applying infor-
mation disclosure requirements to agencies); id. §553 (applying rulemaking 
requirements to agencies) .
36 . Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N .Y .U . L . Rev . 
534, 641-42 (2000) .
37 . 5 U .S .C . §553(b)-(c) (2012) .
38 . E.g., United States v . N .S . Food Prods . Corp ., 568 F .2d 240, 251-52 (2d 
Cir . 1977) .
Copyright © 2015 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
8-2015 NEWS & ANALYSIS 45 ELR 10779
Even after standards are incorporated, SDOs do not 
seem bound to continue making incorporated standards 
available at any price, even when they are referenced in 
and compose a portion of federally binding law . In fact, 
SDOs already have made some incorporated standards 
unavailable, likely undermining or even eliminating 
their enforceability .
II. Does Law Need to Be Public?
The IBR situation runs afoul of a widely shared intu-
ition—that law created by the federal government needs to 
be meaningfully public . Public access issues around IBR 
rules have been less of a focal point compared with public 
access to a range of less broadly applicable, but more cap-
tivating, governmental decisions: say, wiretapping policy, 
or whether drone strikes can be used abroad (or domesti-
cally) to target American citizens who are suspected terror-
ists . Meanwhile, proponents of IBR rules have suggested 
that, despite the lack of access, agencies save significant 
resources by using these rules, and some citizens may not 
see them as terribly interesting or important because they 
are “technical .”39 But these rules, which impact public 
health, safety, and the environment, are among the most 
far-reaching government actions . Meaningful public access 
is thus vital .
Understanding the importance of public access to these 
rules may matter immediately for several reasons . First, it 
could matter for purposes of legal reform by Congress, the 
executive branch, or the judiciary . Congress could simply 
require meaningful free public availability of all materials 
incorporated into federal rules, or it could expressly address 
the copyright and public access issues in another way .
Fully assessing why law needs to be public could affect 
executive reform decisions . The OFR could reform its IBR 
rules, or the OMB could revise Circular No . A-119 to 
emphasize public access .40 Meanwhile, individual agencies 
could change their incorporation practices .
Further, IBR rules could face legal challenges under 
the APA and FOIA . One could argue that agency utiliza-
tion of material for which SDOs charge access fees violates 
FOIA’s statutory requirement that incorporated materials 
be “reasonably available to the class of persons affected .”41 
Any reasonable sense of the words “persons affected” 
would seem to encompass, depending on the subject area, 
large groups of consumers, employees in hazardous work-
places, and neighbors of natural gas pipelines .42 For such 
“affected” persons, the access fees charged may present a 
barrier that is far from “reasonable .”
A court might also hear arguments that a federal rule 
with incorporated private material for which access fees are 
charged violates the APA . The APA requires that an “inter-
39 . See, e.g., Bremer, supra note 5, at 183 .
40 . Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus 
Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities, 77 Fed . Reg . 19357 
(Mar . 30, 2012) .
41 . 5 U .S .C . §552(a)(1) .
42 . E.g., Thompson v . N . Am . Stainless, LP, 562 U .S . 170, 178 (2011) .
ested person[  ]” be able to comment on a proposed rule 
and to petition to revise a final rule .43 Commenting and 
petitioning are difficult, at best, when seeing the text of the 
rule requires either travel or a significant fee .
Finally, a more thorough assessment of the importance 
of ensuring meaningful access to federal rules is an oppor-
tunity to consider, more generally, why we need govern-
mental transparency .
A. Transparency and Notice
The text of IBR materials needs to be readily and pub-
licly accessible to give notice to those who must conform 
their conduct to the content of the standards . Regulated 
entities need to be able to learn their obligations easily .44 
Moreover, due process bars the imposition of sanctions 
on someone who could not have received notice of her 
obligations .45 Small businesses charged with compliance 
have complained in comments filed with the OFR that 
the prices charged by SDOs are too high for them to 
apprise themselves of their obligations . SDOs can even 
make standards effectively unavailable by no longer offer-
ing them for sale .
Further, for regulatory regimes where incorporated stan-
dards are used, those standards also affect indirect regula-
tory beneficiaries, both individuals and entities . Congress 
enacts regulatory statutes specifically to guard wide swaths 
of the public . These range from the Safe Drinking Water 
Act and the Pipeline Safety Act to the Consumer Prod-
uct Safety and Motor Vehicle Safety Acts .46 The public can 
reasonably expect to benefit, including through helpful 
agency action .
Regulatory beneficiaries need notice of the content of 
regulatory standards because those standards can affect 
their choices of which toys or infant swings to buy, where 
to live, or whether to drink tap water . The content, not 
just the existence, of regulatory standards is important; a 
neighbor might view pipeline or drinking water standards, 
even if complied with, as inadequately protective . She still 
might choose to relocate or filter her water . If notice is to 
be effective, meaningful public access to the law’s content 
must be provided to anyone potentially affected, not just to 
those who must comply .
B. Accountability for Legislative and Quasi-
Legislative Actions
In addition to the need for notice to both regulated enti-
ties and regulatory beneficiaries, IBR rules also need to be 
43 . See 5 U .S .C . §553(c), (e); cf. United States v . N .S . Food Prods . Corp ., 568 
F .2d 240, 251-52 (2d Cir . 1977) .
44 . See Lawrence A . Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, 
Lawmaking and the Case of Accounting, 104 Mich . L . Rev . 291, 321 (2005) .
45 . See Christopher v . SmithKline Beecham Corp ., 132 S . Ct . 2156, 2167-68 
(2012) (refusing to defer to agency interpretation in view of “the principle 
that agencies should provide regulated parties ‘fair warning of the conduct 
[a regulation] prohibits or requires’”) .
46 . See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 10, at 415 .
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readily and publicly available so that citizens can hold the 
government accountable both for complying with the law 
and for devising it, safeguarding against arbitrary conduct 
or “capture .” A lack of ready public access undermines the 
public’s ability to hold government accountable .
Consider the agency’s own decision whether to utilize 
the SDO standard at all . Even the most public-interested 
agency official47 is likely to be interested in the significant 
resource savings from adoption of SDO rules, including 
rules that represent less-than-perfect implementation of the 
agency’s statutory commands .
Pragmatic political concerns, including reducing the 
resistance of regulated entities, also may nudge an agency 
to adopt a less-than-ideal SDO standard rather than draft 
a “government-unique” standard . If regulated entities are 
well-represented in Congress or in the White House as well 
as in the relevant SDO, an agency also might expect fewer 
hassles from political overseers .
Further, once an agency has developed a pattern of rely-
ing on privately generated standards, an agency may find 
it even harder to modify or reject those standards, because 
devising or locating replacement standards likely will be 
costlier than if the agency had well-established regulatory 
resources and staff of its own .48
Ensuring that the agency is accountable for wisely 
choosing which IBR rules to adopt depends on meaning-
ful public access to those rules . For agency rulemaking to 
serve as any sort of useful safeguard against poor standards 
when an agency elects to incorporate an SDO standard, 
the SDO standard and supporting data has to be meaning-
fully available during rulemaking, to ensure the participa-
tion of regulatory beneficiaries and ordinary citizens .
Other mechanisms for holding agencies accountable for 
their choice of IBR rules also depend on ready public access 
to those rules . The public might wish to seek congressio-
nal oversight or new statutes that more specifically direct 
agency action,49 to register disapproval through voting, or 
to file a lawsuit seeking judicial review of the agency’s deci-
sion . Our current regime of limited public access to IBR 
rules undermines all these accountability mechanisms .
C. The Distinctive Burdens Imposed by Access 
Prices for IBR Rules
One could say that IBR rule prices pale next to costs, like 
legal fees, that can accompany lawsuits challenging agency 
rules . But readers also need access to the text of rules to 
inform compliance decisions, purchases, medical choices, 
letters to Congress or comments to agencies, and voting .   
These are not necessarily costly activities . Prices for IBR 
rules accordingly represent a distinct obstacle . Moreover, 
these access limitations are not random; they systemati-
47 . Cf. Sidney A . Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 Duke L .J . 
389, 399 (2003) .
48 . Id. at 410-11 .
49 . See Jodi L . Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative Law: Power, 
Rationality, and Reasons, 61 Duke L .J . 1811, 1821 (2012) .
cally exclude people based on budgetary constraints . Con-
sumers and neighbors are likely to have smaller budgets 
relative to regulated manufacturers and pipeline operators . 
Regulated entities typically have an advantage, compared 
with the general public, in participating in policymaking, 
including in obtaining expert and legal technical assistance 
and in joining SDOs . Access costs may worsen this imbal-
ance by keeping many consumers and neighbors from even 
getting in the door .
D. Expressive Harm Imposed by Access Fees
Having to pay a fee to read the law can obstruct indi-
viduals from learning their obligations, making informed 
decisions, or seeking governmental accountability . The gov-
ernment’s decision to regulate by incorporating expensive, 
difficult-to-locate standards also sends a damaging message 
to the public that may feed public cynicism regarding the 
openness and accountability of government .
Incorporating standards into law that are generally avail-
able only after paying a significant fee set by a private entity 
or traveling to Washington, D .C ., contrasts starkly with 
the strong American tradition, since at least 1795, of wide-
spread public access to the law . This tradition includes, for 
example, the use of depository libraries starting in the mid-
1800s and the passage of the Federal Register Act of 1935, 
the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments 
of 1996, and the e-Government Act of 2002 .50
When private organizations largely control access to 
the law, including the apparent power to curtail access to 
the text, this category of law, unlike federal statutes, other 
federal regulations, and federal court opinions, does not 
appear to be under public control . Even if only some citi-
zens are effectively prevented from reading IBR standards, 
agencies are expressing a view fundamentally inconsistent 
with the strong Congressional policy of open access to the 
law . Limited access to IBR rules also undermines the First 
Amendment’s core value of free discussion of governmental 
affairs .51 This value undergirds the “right of the people to 
choose” governmental officials, directly or indirectly, in the 
electoral process .52
III. Permissible Reform Measures
Given a fuller understanding of the reasons why law must 
be readily available to the public, reform of IBR standards 
is required . Any further legislative or administrative 
action on agency use of incorporated private standards 
should ensure permanent, widespread public availability 
of those standards . At a minimum, full access is needed 
50 . E.g., Act of Feb . 5, 1859, ch . 22, §10, 11 Stat . 379, 381; Electronic Free-
dom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub . L . No . 104-231, 
§4(7), 110 Stat . 3048, 3049; E-Government Act of 2002, Pub . L . No . 107-
347, §§206(a)-(d), 207(f ), 116 Stat . 2899, 2915-16, 2918-19 (codified as 
amended at 44 U .S .C . §3501 (2006) note (Federal Management and Pro-
motion of Electronic Government Services)) .
51 . Snyder v . Phelps, 562 U .S . 443, 452 (2011) .
52 . See United States v . Classic, 313 U .S . 299, 314 (1941) .
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to ensure that all interested parties, including both regu-
lated entities and regulatory beneficiaries, have appropri-
ate notice of their legal liabilities and entitlements . Any 
reform should provide citizens with assured access during 
the entire period the SDO rule has been incorporated 
into federal regulatory law . That access ought to be pro-
vided in a centralized location that is easy for individuals 
to find . Such centralized access must be freely avail-
able through governmental depository libraries . Library 
access to hard copies could be provided, although it 
seems likely that most members of the public now rely on 
digital access .53 Ideally, reform would provide access to 
IBR rules through text or direct links on the Government 
Printing Office and Federal Register websites, and addi-
tionally through federal agency websites .54 Access should 
be through federally controlled websites to address a sec-
ond critical barrier to public access—the enormous dif-
ficulty of locating IBR standards currently strewn over 
many different SDO websites .
Full digital access without charge, beyond what is avail-
able at governmental depository libraries, would place 
access to IBR standards on the same footing as other fed-
eral regulations . The current read-only access to these stan-
dards occasionally provided at the option of and only upon 
conditions set by SDOs is insufficient .
Nor is the OFR’s regulatory approach adequate . OFR 
has missed an opportunity to speak directly to the level 
of public access required before language can be incorpo-
rated by reference into federal agency rules without Fed-
eral Register publication . A federal agency finalizing a rule 
must now “[d]iscuss” the way the agency “worked to make 
the materials  .  .  . reasonably available,” but this modest 
requirement for an agency statement contemplates OFR 
approval of agency use of an IBR rule that is not, in fact, 
“reasonably available .”55
An agency might have a number of options to ensure 
meaningful access to private IBR standards, other than 
permitting the SDO to set access charges .56 For example, 
an agency could negotiate a license with an SDO to make 
IBR standards readily available to the public through a link 
on the Federal Register or CFR website . While this public 
availability may result in some revenue losses for SDOs, 
federal agency incorporation also can increase the demand 
for books of SDO standards . No-longer-current versions 
of SDO standards are sometimes priced higher than cur-
rent versions simply because a federal agency has elected 
to incorporate the older one by reference .57 Particularly in 
groups where regulated entities are well represented, the 
strong interest in influencing the content of the law may 
even motivate an SDO to agree to online public access 
53 . Comment of Michael Herz, Sec . Chair, Section of Admin . Law & Regula-
tory Practice, Am . Bar Ass’n 11 (OFR Docket June 1, 2012), available at 
http://www .regulations .gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006481025ea
5&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf .
54 . Bremer, supra note 5, at 179 .
55 . Incorporation by Reference, 78 Fed . Reg . 60784, 60797 (revision to 1 
C .F .R . §51 .5(a)(1), proposed Oct . 2, 2013) .
56 . E.g., Cunningham, supra note 44, at 338-41 .
57 . E.g., Strauss, supra note 19, at 509-10 .
without further charge .58 The fact that several SDOs have 
elected to make IBR standards available on a read-only 
basis on their own websites following the initiation of the 
OFR rulemaking supports the conclusion that agency 
negotiation of a price for incorporated standards may not 
be tremendously difficult or expensive .
In the case of an SDO that regularly supplies govern-
mental standards, such as the National Fire Protection 
Association or the API, governmental contracting may also 
be an option . Besides resolving in favor of the government 
the question of who owns the copyright to material that 
ends up in federal rules,59 contracting would also permit 
the agency to solicit bids to supply standards, thus increas-
ing competition among groups to do so and enabling the 
agency to specify more open and accessible processes for 
standards development .60 For an SDO who is unwilling to 
sign such a contract or to negotiate to provide public access 
as a condition of incorporation, a federal agency intent on 
incorporating a publicly accessible standard would face a 
choice between drafting a government-unique standard or 
using compulsory licensing provisions .61
What should be out of bounds? Any proposal that con-
tinues to rely primarily on SDOs for public access, so that 
the SDOs can condition access on the payment of fees or 
revoke it altogether .62 Reforms must assure that groups cur-
rently underrepresented in agency and SDO processes have 
access to the text of these rules—and thus have a chance 
at participating in standards development and at invoking 
mechanisms of accountability . The best approach would 
be a straightforward one that provides free, easy-to-locate 
online access to the entire public .63
Any charge, even a small fee, could obstruct access to 
the poor or those who seek access to multiple standards, 
and it would still communicate a message of hostility to 
core democratic values . These standards should be publicly 
available in the same manner as other federal regulatory 
standards—for free in governmental depository libraries 
and, ideally, through the Government Printing Office and 
agency websites as well .
IV. Conclusion: On Public Access
These over 9,000 IBR rules, covering areas ranging from 
infant seat safety to pipeline operation, are published ad 
hoc in numerous locations and are hard to locate, even 
when federal agencies provide SDO contact informa-
tion in the CFR . Of even greater concern, public access 
to these standards is primarily through private organiza-
58 . See Comment of R . Bruce Josten, Exec . Vice President of Gov’t Affairs, 
Chamber of Commerce of the U .S . 1 (OFR Docket Apr . 3, 2012), available 
at http://www .regulations .gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006480feb7
94&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf .
59 . See Rights in Data—General, 48 C .F .R . §52 .227-14(b) (2012) .
60 . See Strauss, supra note 19, at 544-45 .
61 . See Cunningham, supra note 44, at 332 .
62 . See, e.g., Bremer, supra note 5, at 180-82 .
63 . Comment of Ronald E . Jarnagin, President, ASHRAE 4 (OFR Docket Mar . 
30, 2012), available at http://www .regulations .gov/contentStreamer?objectI
d=0900006480fe4f56&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf .
Copyright © 2015 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
45 ELR 10782 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 8-2015
tions empowered to charge significant fees and, effectively, 
to revoke access . With IBR rules, the public’s access is 
impaired disproportionately based on income .
Access must be generally available to both regulated 
entities and the intended beneficiaries of legislation . If 
those burdened with obligations cannot learn their sub-
stance without paying hundreds of dollars to an SDO or 
traveling to Washington, D .C ., the law is not meaning-
fully public .
Federal regulatory actions apply to the entire public—
broadly and for an indefinite duration . These legislative 
or quasi-legislative actions are among the most significant 
powers exercised by the federal government . Access to the 
text of these rules cannot just be a formality; the text must 
be readily, meaningfully available to the public, including 
substantial levels of public access without charge . Increased 
transparency in the form of meaningful public access is the 
bare minimum for accountability .
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